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Abstract 
Source and information evaluation is identified as being a critical element of the analytical process and 
production of intelligence products.  However there is concern that in reality evaluation is being carried out in a 
cursory fashion involving limited intellectual rigour.  Poor evaluation is also thought to be a causal factor in the 
failure of intelligence.  This study examined the process of information and source evaluation as understood and 
practiced by, six West Australian Police Force, (WAPOL) intelligence analysts.  Data was gathered by use of a 
focus group with that data being compared against the current literature.  It was discovered that formal training 
in evaluation methods was limited.  The significance of evaluation was however clearly understood and the lack 
of sufficient training was recognised as a limitation to analysis.  The study however identified that this group of 
analysts did practice evaluation through a process of ongoing information contextualisation. 
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INTRODUCTION
The evaluation of information is in theory a critical component of the intelligence process.  However there is 
concern that in reality evaluation; defined as “an exercise in judgement about the reliability of the data source 
and the data quality and content, in terms of validity and credibility”, is being carried out in a cursory fashion 
involving limited intellectual rigour and “is in danger of being trivialised or even ignored” (McDowell, 2009, p. 
195).  It has been suggested that a malaise in evaluation may even be a causal factor in the failure of intelligence 
(Sandow-Quirk, 2002).  In 2010 a study to examine the process of information and source evaluation by 
intelligence analysts in the West Australian Police force (WAPOL) to determine what methods they employ was 
undertaken.  A focus group interview involving six intelligence analysts was conducted during which the 
analysts were questioned in depth on their knowledge of and approaches to evaluation.  This paper details the 
results of that study and provides some insight to the process of evaluation as practiced by WAPOL analysts.  
Background 
Intelligence is a subject traditionally cloaked in secrecy and mystery, ethereal and elusive to the public. However 
the end of the cold war heralded the start of a wave of academic research that has been even more pronounced in 
the aftermath of the 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks.  Since that event, terrorism has been among the most 
newsworthy subjects in the world with intelligence more often than not being intrinsically linked.  The link 
however has in many cases been a negative one for the intelligence community, as its practice or malpractice has 
been blamed for providing ill-conceived intelligence, ignoring intelligence that does not meet political objectives 
and the for the failure to prevent or predict terrorist attacks.  The September 11 terrorist attacks and the Madrid 
train bombings are cases in point and often cited as examples of the consequences of poor intelligence process.  
Within an Australian context the 2007 wrongful detention of Mohammed Haneef by Australian law enforcement 
agencies, brought about largely due to the poor evaluation of available evidence is an example of community 
perceptions of Australian law enforcement intelligence being sullied (Corkill, 2009).  Due to the breadth of the 
domain, significance and importance of intelligence a deep body of literature has evolved focussing on subjects 
such as intelligence failure, intelligence analysis, how intelligence can be improved and the role of the 
intelligence analyst (Atran, 2006; Canton, 2008; Cooper, 2005; Gill & Phythian, 2006; Heuer, 1999; Lefebvre, 
2004; Sandow-Quirk, 2002; Weiss, 2008).  Most of this academic research has been focussed on intelligence 
from a national security perspective; yet there has also been a recent growth in law enforcement intelligence 
literature with primary reference to the concept of intelligence led policing (Cope, 2004; de Lint, O'Connor, & 
Cotter, 2007; J. Ratcliffe, 2002; J. H. Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008; Taylor, Kowalyk, & Boba, 2007; Verfaillie & 
Vander Beken, 2008).  Research in this domain has predominately been concerned with the use of criminal 
intelligence and crime analysis and how it directs the policing process, whilst research on the role of the 
intelligence analyst is not nearly as pronounced as it is in national security literature.  In particular, how 
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intelligence analysts evaluate information in the law enforcement domain is an area especially deficient in 
current research.   
While many films and novels portray intelligence as consisting of glamorous spies who use futuristic technology 
in collecting information, in reality it is the intelligence analyst that is the heart of the intelligence process.  The 
analyst instigates the collection of information and in turn is responsible for the managing and understanding of 
that information.  It is also argued by scholars that it is the analyst that creates the actual intelligence product, 
distributes it, generates its context and provides advice and overall insights so that it can be of value for decision 
making (Cooper, 2005; Lefebvre, 2004).  Therefore, it is important to understand the role and methods used by 
intelligence analysts in order to improve intelligence.  If a failure of evaluation occurs, the true value of an item 
of information cannot be known and will in turn have a detrimental run on effect on the rest of the intelligence 
process; thus it can be argued that methods intelligence analysts allocate to evaluate information is in need of 
particular scrutiny.  It is how information is evaluated by a group of intelligence analysts in the law enforcement 
domain that forms the primary focus of this research.    
Objectives of the Study 
The aim of this study was to gain an insight into what is currently an underdeveloped area of research and 
determine how the participants of this study view information evaluation.  In particular the study set out to 
uncover the methods utilised by analysts, the time they allocated to evaluation, the rigour required to complete 
evaluation tasks and the importance they attribute to the task. 
In order to achieve the research objectives of this project the following question was posed: How do law 
enforcement intelligence analysts evaluate intelligence?  
Methodology 
The outcomes of this study were achieved through the qualitative interpretation of a focus group interview 
consisting of six WAPOL intelligence analysts. The session concentrated on the question posed above and lasted 
for around 80 minutes.  The focus group responses were then compared and contrasted too the existing literature 
on a number of topics relevant to the research including intelligence in the law enforcement domain, the role and 
importance of intelligence analysts, skills and attributes required by good analysts, intelligence failure, how 
uncertainty is dealt with in intelligence and evaluation methodologies.   
ANALYSTS, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 
Over the last two decades there has been a steady increase in the use of intelligence to support policing 
operations.  With this increased utility of the function there has also been a commensurate increase in the 
number of intelligence analysts in the domain.  Innes, Fielding and Cope (2005, p. 42) in trying to uncover core 
functions of analysts in policing, cited an English police intelligence unit chief as stating that the prime roles 
practiced by intelligence analysts include “identifying potential sources, identifying the source leads to crime, 
make sure we have our network charts up to date, make sure we are intervening in the right places... providing 
intelligence for resourcing patrols on the ground”.  In conducting analysis, the analyst will attempt to answer key 
questions to determine inferences that help to develop an understanding of an issue or problem.  These questions 
attempt to fill information gaps to help encompass the entire picture of a specific problem such as determining 
key individuals, key criminal activities and when, where, how and why these criminals are conducting these 
activities (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2007).  In doing so, the analyst generates two major modes of 
intelligence analysis known explicitly as criminal intelligence and crime analysis. The former is concerned with 
“detailing the activity of a known suspect or suspects” while crime intelligence enhances “the police 
understanding about a specific crime or series of crimes” (Innes, et al., 2005, p. 44).  
In conducting analysis, intelligence analysts are “essentially information translators, whose role is to review 
information and provide reliable intelligence in a practical and operational format” (Cope, 2004, p. 188).  The 
U.K. National Intelligence Model describes four key products that intelligence analysts create as a result of the 
analysis process, specifically strategic assessments, tactical assessments, target profiles and problem profiles 
(Association of Chief Police Officers, 2005). Strategic assessments drive the intelligence function of a police 
force by detailing long term crime issues affecting the jurisdiction whilst tactical assessments drive the 
intelligence function through the focus of shorter term issues.  Target profiles are concerned with securing “a 
greater understanding of either a person (suspect or victim) or group of people, in line with the control strategy 
priorities or high risk issues” whereas problem profiles aim to “secure a greater understanding of established and 
emerging crime or incident series, priority locations and other identified high risk issues” (Association of Chief 
Police Officers, 2005, p. 64).  This enables proactive action towards identifying key problem areas and targets 
and in doing so dictates the police effort in preventing crime. 
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Information Evaluation and Uncertainty in Intelligence 
Information evaluation is concerned with appraising an item of information in terms of its credibility together 
with an appraisal of the reliability of the source.  As such evaluation is the “the considered judgement of the 
accuracy, completeness and inherent meaning of an item of information” (Palmer, 1991, p. 22).  In the process of 
evaluation, items “will be evaluated by the analyst with his/her knowledge of the topic, form his/her experience 
of the behaviour, by comparison with other relevant data, or by some combination of all these criteria” (Palmer, 
1991, p. 22).  Information presented to analysts is rarely ever simply true or false and is disseminated in vastly 
different ways by a wide array of sources.  Therefore evaluation is a much needed practice for analysts to 
implement as part of the overall process of interpreting the meaning of collected information (McDowell, 2009).  
According to Corkill (2008) there are a number of key indicators that analysts consider when evaluating 
information and sources including “source capability, source history or performance, information origin, source 
motivation, bias, information credibility, and information pertinence”.  The importance of evaluation in 
intelligence production cannot be underestimated as a failure to conduct it properly will undoubtedly result in a 
failure of intelligence.  There is a solid body of literature that validates the importance that evaluation has in 
producing good intelligence (Corkill, 2008; Heuer, 1999; Marrin & Clemente, 2005; McDowell, 2009; Moore, 
Kirzan, & Moore, 2005; Rodgers, 2006; Sandow-Quirk, 2002).  Evaluation is needed to judge the integrity of 
sources and information; however it also plays a significant role in reducing and managing uncertainty in 
decision making.   
The topic of uncertainty has particular relevance in the field of intelligence.  George (2004, p. 386) quotes Carl 
Von Clausewitz as saying “Many intelligence reports are contradictory; even more are false, and most are 
uncertain.”  The intelligence analyst must deal with diverse and often ambiguous types of information ranging 
from document to taped conversations, maps to computer files and therefore it is inevitable there will be a notion 
of uncertainty in intelligence production (Gill & Phythian, 2006).  Simply defined uncertainty in an intelligence 
context is “what an analyst doesn’t or cannot know, either because of missing information, the complexity of an 
issue, or the nature of a mystery” (Canton, 2008, p. 488).  There is a strong body of literature available dealing 
with the concept of uncertainty and how it can be managed in intelligence through a variety of different 
methodologies (Canton, 2008; Heuer, 1999; Kent, 1964; Marrin & Clemente, 2005; Weiss, 2008). Weiss (2008) 
identifies the need to consider alternating hypotheses - that is the attention to hypotheses that are divergent to 
what would be the most common interpretation of information in order to gain a wider picture of a problem - to 
combat the issue of uncertainty.  Canton (2008, p. 488) calls for the a more rigorous and aggressive approach in 
providing value added intelligence to decision maker through a four phase plan which includes “drilling into 
what is known, unknown, and the implications of each on key issues; countering information gaps with 
aggressive action; calibrating knowledge of uncertainty through regular reviews and tests; and practicing 
transparent communication in discussions with policymakers about uncertainty.”  Another method identified in 
reducing and simplifying information is the creation of mental models and the ensuing processing and evaluation 
of new information through those models (Heuer, 1999).  While it can be argued that information evaluation is a 
component of each of the above techniques, there are systems available, although limited in number, where 
information and source evaluation is the primary concern.  
Evaluation Systems 
A review of the literature indicates that there are few formal evaluation systems used by analysts worldwide to 
evaluate information for intelligence purposes, although it is important that this review introduces the most 
common systems that are covered.  By far the most well-known of these methods is the Admiralty System 
(alternatively called the NATO System) which is used to demonstrate the net worth of a particular piece of 
information based on both source reliability and data validity (Besombes, Nimier, & Cholvy, 2009; Corkill, 
2008; McDowell, 2009).  This alpha numeric grading system is used at the Western Australian Police Force and 
while there are different variants in use around the world, the traditional model is the 6 x6 matrix shown below.  
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Table 1. Admiralty Scale for Source and Information Evaluation 
 
Source Reliability Information Credibility 
A Completely reliable 1 Confirmed by other sources 
B Usually reliable 2 Probably true 
C Fairly reliable 3 Possibly true 
D Not usually reliable 4 Doubtful 
E Unreliable 5 Improbable 
F Reliability cannot be judged 6 Truth cannot be judged 
(Adapted from Besombes, Nimier & Cholvy, 2009).  
In the United Kingdom, law enforcement agencies operating under the National Intelligence Model use an 
alternative grading system commonly referred to as the 5x5x5 system. Similarly to the Admiralty Scale, the 
5x5x5 report assesses the reliability of the source and the veracity of the information; however it also grades the 
handling sensitivity of the information as an additional component of the system (Spinelli & Sharma, 2007).  
Despite the extra risk component, the 5x5x5 system is, like the Admiralty Scale, a tool to collate already 
evaluated information.  Neither system itself evaluates information per se.  It is fair to say then that the literature 
available on evaluation systems is predominately superficial.  In fact the literature concerned with how analysts 
actually practice the task of evaluation is quite limited, restricted mainly to the key grading systems used by 
analysts and not reaching deeply enough into the context behind making decisions on how an item of 
information should be graded.   
What is Missing? 
There is little doubt from the literature that in theory, evaluation is considered an essential step in the intelligence 
process.  However some of the literature also states that in reality analysts may not be practicing evaluation to 
the level of its perceived importance (Corkill, 2008; McDowell, 2009). Mcdowell (2009) considered that some 
analysts excuse their lack of effort and attention to the process of evaluation because they find it too time 
consuming and difficult. For instance in some law enforcement agencies “the fundamental principles of source 
and validity evaluation have already been changed to reflect an impatience and frustration with the intellectual 
difficulty of blending the two elements.  Evaluation grading systems are being progressively simplified.” 
(McDowell, 2009, p. 212).  These are worrying comments but the fact is that there is very little if any research 
on analysts being formally asked to explain their thoughts on evaluation and more importantly, how they 
actually perform it.  Considering evaluation is acknowledged widely as a critical component of the intelligence 
process, this is of concern and further research is required in this area. 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Analysis of the focus group transcript clearly identified a number of issues most notably the lack of an explicit or 
formal process of information evaluation.  This however was not evidence of a complete lack of information 
evaluation processes.  It was clear that information evaluation does occur however the process is implicit and 
informal rather than proscribed.   
The participants of this study do not appear to practice any strictly formal methods when involved in the task of 
evaluation and instead follow a number of informal measures that revolve around determining a number of 
aspects relating to an item of information such as its relevance and credibility as well as the history, capability 
and motivation of a source.   
It was also noted that the participants evaluate these issues almost always according to the overall context of a 
particular issue, a holistic viewpoint that puts more emphasis on how items of information relate with what is 
already known than strictly on its own merits. 
However, the focus group demonstrated that at least for these participants, the task of evaluation is treated very 
seriously and is no doubt considered an integral part of their role.  All of the participants indicated that they 
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spend as much time as necessary to evaluate information and sources and as such time factors do not have an 
effect on how often or how extensively they evaluate.  
Interestingly despite the perceived importance of evaluation, the participants professed that they had received 
very little training in how to evaluate and had instead largely self-taught themselves.  A finding that suggests that 
the training provided to these analysts in regards to evaluation is largely insufficient and inadequate.  
Discussion 
The intent of this study was to determine what methods and strategies analysts use to evaluate information.  
Therefore it is significant that all of the participants involved in the focus group described predominately 
informal processes to explain how they went about evaluating sources and information.  When evaluating 
information, the WAPOL analyst seems to investigate criteria consistent with the literature on information 
evaluation in that they consider information credibility, information relevance and when possible source history 
and source motivation (Herbert, 2006; Heuer, 1999; Marrin & Clemente, 2005; McDowell, 2009; Rodgers, 
2006).  Within the context of practice, it became clear that whilst they continually evaluate throughout the 
analytic process such evaluation practice is primarily informal processes predominately self-taught while on the 
job.  This system, or lack of, is potentially fraught with danger because as Mcdowell explains, without 
formalised evaluation measures, there is the possibility that “individual analysts would be influenced by their 
own recent and case- specific experience and become vulnerable to their own individual biases.” (2009, pp. 211-
219).   
The analysts nominated the Admiralty Scale or NATO System as the only formal evaluation system that they 
were aware of.  However the Admiralty Scale is effectively irrelevant because in practice it is rarely used and is 
not actually an evaluation methodology per se but a grading system.  Of note almost all of the analysts 
repeatedly referred to the Admiralty Scale throughout the focus group discussion, speaking of it as if it was a 
true evaluation system.  Additionally and perhaps more importantly, the Admiralty Scale was the only evaluation 
related topic taught to them in training. The context behind deciding what ratings to give an item of information 
was not an issue addressed in training and instead personal judgement was encouraged.  This issue is something 
that complements Corkill’s argument that the Admiralty Scale could be a source of intelligence failure mainly 
because “it appears that to many analysts the Admiralty Scale appears to have become confused with the process 
of evaluation.”(2009, p. 9).  
Evaluation processes, while predominately implicit are practiced by the participants of this study.  This is made 
evident by the constant reference to the contextualizing of information as a means of testing veracity.  For 
instance it was explained by the analysts that in most cases after a piece of information is reviewed, it is either 
validated, corroborated or rejected based on what is already contained in the body of the collected elements of 
information.  A potential weakness of this contextual approach is that it can effectively eliminate evidence or 
information that contradicts the larger body of available evidence.  This is a fallacious way of evaluating because 
it too readily negates what could potentially be accurate intelligence.  Kovacs (1997) view that failures of 
intelligence can occur because of the non-use of information seems particularly relevant here as such an 
approach would surely increase the chances of this type of failure occurring.  
Another significant issue raised from the results is the importance that the participants credited to the process of 
evaluation and the data obtained from the focus group indicated that this may be because of an apparent culture 
ensconced in WAPOL that strongly encourages vigorous evaluation. That the analysts explained that they had 
hardly received any training regarding evaluation made this point particularly interesting. There could be a 
number of explanations for this anomaly in the data. One such possibility is that because there is an inherent 
need in policing to find and present evidence to prosecute criminals, an organizational culture exists that 
demands that analysts always effectively evaluate the merits of collected evidence and thus are forced to learn 
this independently as part of their role. There is also the possible notion that the participants were over 
emphasizing the role evaluation plays in their work so not to look inadequate in this particular discussion. 
Nonetheless, regardless of the possible reasoning the underlying issue here is that, at least from the data of the 
focus group, there appears to be a clear need for better evaluation training provided to intelligence analysts at 
WAPOL.    
CONCLUSION 
The importance of evaluating information and sources is understood by intelligence analysts and is clearly 
demonstrated by the views of participants of this study and more broadly in the intelligence literature.  However 
the acknowledged importance of evaluation is incongruent with the lack of detailed and comprehensive training 
provided to analysts.  This study whilst small has highlighted an aspect of intelligence training that requires 
significant development and further research.  Notwithstanding the lack of training opportunities provided it is 
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reassuring to note that analysts do actively seek to determine information veracity and truthfulness wherever 
possible. 
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